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 The History of European Relations is the study of war. Time and again any period 
of European peace is shattered by war and every war is ended with a renewed 
commitment to peace, a commitment that ultimately fails. War and peace, and how the 
two evolve into the other, is the most basic system of understanding for Europe’s 
fractured past. For political scientists the method of analysis is Realism’s balance of 
power involving the rise and fall of Europe’s many empires. Power is the idea that 
country A is able to cause country B to pursue policy that they otherwise wouldn’t by 
using tools such as military might and economic and cultural influence.  
 Balance of power is a method of analysis that focus on the system level of country 
interaction and concerns itself with who has the power in a system and how they use it. In 
Europe the actors were the various empires that have risen and fallen. Because of their 
diversity as well as their geographic proximity to one another, Balance of power is 
appropriate given the changing dynamics through the centuries of European power 
politics. Kenneth Waltz makes the argument that the most stable form of power is a bi-
polar arrangement, when two powers share the majority of the influence such as the 
situation during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is 
also the unipolar world; exemplified by the situation the United States found itself in 
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Huntington, 36). Conversely a 
world where more than two powers share the most influence is called a multipolar world 
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and is known as the most unstable form of power distribution. Political theorists would 
argue that the uncertainty inherent in international relations, coupled with the power 
available to so many actors makes the system less stable and more prone to war. They 
would point to situations such as the lead up to both World Wars, as well as the situations 
before the Napoleonic and Thirty Years Wars. The problem, they argue, is that powerful 
countries take the initiative in solving Mearsheimer’s “911 problem:” the idea that 
because there is no world policeman countries must be aggressive and offensive to fix all 
problems, real and imagined (Anarchy and the Struggle for Power, 56). Multipolar 
devolution has often led to the World’s most destructive wars and the system is 
mistrusted with reason. This argument about the systemic instability surrounding a 
multipolar system does not hold water however when one regards the successes of the 
Concert of Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the Franco-Prussian 
War in 1870, a period of peace that lasted 55 years!  
 On November 9, 1799 a gifted French commander with a penchant for unlikely 
military victories took control of the French Revolutionary Government and created the 
First French Empire. Napoleon Bonaparte did more in 15 years to shape European affairs 
than any single individual in European history since Charlemagne. It is unnecessary and 
impossible to cover all the topics of the Napoleonic Wars in 15 pages. Understanding 
however the basic events of the wars are essential in understanding the peace that 
followed. 
 Napoleon took command over a France that was already at war with its neighbors 
in Europe. The revolutionary government had taken the unrest of the people following the 
French Revolution and transformed it into an expansionist drive. This was seen in France 
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as a logical resolution, they were simply taking the ideas of the revolution; liberty, 
freedom, and republicanism and freeing the people’s of Europe from monarchy. 
Napoleon followed this thought process and throughout his reign fought against old 
empires and kings while allying with republics, creating republics in conquered kingdoms 
(World Book, 14).  
 After Napoleon came to power his first success came in defeating the Second 
Coalition that had formed in response to the resurgent France’s power. The Republic of 
France had defeated the First Coalition in 1797 with Napoleon as its victorious 
commander in service of the people.  Within a year of coming to power and declaring 
himself Emperor Napoleon crushed the Austrian Empire and conquered Italy, ending the 
threat from the Coalition. Notably however, Britain remained, still able to harass France’s 
interests overseas with its navy, which was the largest in the world. From the end of the 
Second Coalition in 1801 to Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815 The French Empire 
expanded and controlled the largest area of land since the Roman Empire. From Spain to 
Poland Napoleon’s France had either conquered or forced dozens of countries and 
territories into the new French Empire (World Book, 16).  
 The seeds for Napoleon’s final defeat took place in 1812 on the plains of Russia. 
By this time France had defeated all of its major Continental rivals and had deposed 
many of the old monarchs leaving none but the Russian Czar Alexander I. In his invasion 
of Russia Napoleon sought to remove one of his longest and strongest enemies. With 
more than a half a million men Napoleon started his invasion in the summer and reached 
Moscow by winter. But with the scorched Earth policy of the Russians and the harsh 
winter the army was forced to turn around. By the time Napoleon got back to France in 
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1813 there were only 27,000 fit men left from the original 650,000. Faced with this 
disaster Napoleon could do little as a Sixth Coalition led by Russia and Great Britain 
marched into Paris and exiled Napoleon. In 1815 Napoleon escaped from the Island of 
Elba and tried to recreate his Empire but was finally defeated at Waterloo.  
 The Napoleonic Wars are noteworthy for several reasons. They marked the first 
war of the Industrial Age with armies on a scale that had never been seen before. They 
introduced the concept of total war, with mass conscriptions of many combatants. Most 
importantly the wars left the political and social landscape of the entire continent 
changed. Along with French rule Napoleon also introduced French revolutionary values 
to the conquered lands of Europe. Though the Kings of Europe returned they would never 
again have the power they once wielded and were forced to concede civil liberties such as 
representation and adhered to the French system of law introduced within Napoleon’s 
empire.  
 To understand the peace that followed it is necessary to understand the Congress 
of Vienna, where representatives of all the powers met to discuss the shape of post-war 
Europe (World Book, 363). All major powers were represented, France, Britain, Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria. Also present were minor powers that fought, Spain, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands (which included the future country of Belgium). France’s 
involvement in the talks was essential to the peace that followed. Originally France was 
not meant to sit in on conferences with the other great powers. However thanks to the 
skillful maneuvering of the French ambassador Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord 
who drafted a plan of protocol for the conference that put France on a level playing field 
with the other powers. Talleyrand was able to do this because he was not there 
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representing Napoleon who actually came back from Elba and was still fighting during 
part of the Congress, which took place from November 1814 to June 1815. Talleyrand 
was there representing the exiled Bourbon royal line who had ruled France before the 
revolution. The Bourbon dynasty signed its own peace accord with the Sixth Coalition in 
May 1814 when Paris was overrun and the French people decided they’d had enough of 
Napoleon. The other monarchs of Europe did not want to risk alienating a King that they 
wanted as an Ally when the war ended. Talleyrand was able to leverage the monarchy’s 
position into favorable decisions made on behalf of France that were not punitive in 
nature, an outcome a few of the Allies, particularly Austria and Russia desired (World 
Book, 363).   
 The formation of the Concert of Europe can be called an attempt by European 
Leaders to move beyond relying solely on balance of power to maintain peace (Elrod, 
161). Since the Peace of Westphalia two centuries prior, balance of power had been the 
de facto mode of peace in Europe, a situation sought by Great Britain, who tried to keep 
their commitments with the Great Powers to a minimum. For decades England “…had 
traditionally equated the promotion of her interest, if not indeed her survival, with the 
fragmentation of power on the continent.” (Albrecht, 25) The desire for diplomacy was 
the work of land based powers, particularly Russia (28). 
 The involvement of France is a key component to the post war peace that was so 
long lasting despite being set in an era when there were many great powers. Historians 
characterize the Congress of Vienna as being nearly devoid of any attempts to punish the 
“instigator” of the war that preceded the conference. Among many others this is one of 
the primary reasons that peace was able to last for so long. The people of France were not 
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left bitter at their former enemies and the Kings of Europe had their status quo back. If 
anything France made out better at the end of the war than they did in fighting the war. 
Numerous resolutions of the Congress dealt with trade and in all instances trade among 
the powers became much more open, particularly over land trade. While the other powers 
did split up certain French lands, they were not lands that had ever been historically 
French. In a geographic sense the Congress defined modern Europe. Borders were drawn 
that last today. No power outside France lost land, and even then the land lost had never 
been considered “French.” Indeed, its said, “The most striking feature of the post-
Napoleonic peace settlement was... the leniency shown towards the vanquished power.” 
(Schenk, 45) Among the great powers present at the Congress of Vienna none could say 
they “lost.”  
 What grew out of the Congress of Vienna and the Napoleonic Wars was 
resentment to war and a commitment of all the people and governments of Europe to 
never fight another great war in their lifetimes (Elrod, 160). From this commitment grew 
the Concert of Europe; an informal agreement between the Great Powers that sought to 
continue the tradition of communication and diplomacy that had thrived at the Congress 
of Vienna. Though the system was never formalized (there were never founding 
documents or written rules) all members felt it was in their best interests to attend the 
conferences. There they could address grievances with the members and reach a 
consensus on ways to deal with problems that involved European Countries who were not 
present at the various Congresses. The Concert’s primary concerns at each meeting were 
in maintaining the balance of power among the Great Powers and prevent the rise of 
another Napoleonic figure among European States. Among the many successes of the 
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system were the reintegration of France and the removal of occupation troops in 1818, 
the peaceful creation of Greece (1830) and Belgium (1831), and most importantly 
preventing a full-scale war among its members until the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. 
Therein lie the most important and lasting achievements of the Concert of Europe. 
Leaders who had worked in an air of cooperation sought to continue that tradition in 
peacetime (Elrod, 162) Why, if a multipolar system is so unstable, was the Concert of 
Europe successful for a period of over 50 years? Indeed the only wars that took place in 
the period were small local wars that were never fought between two members of the 
Concert, such as the Crimean War involving the Ottoman Empire in 1854. Were the 
successes due to the actions of the Concert itself as Idealists would like to believe, or was 
it due to something larger? 
 Of the members of the Grand Alliance that finally defeated Napoleon’s France, 
none benefited more from the peace or came out of the war with the most gained than 
Great Britain. During the war Britain was delivered the means to govern and protect its 
empire on a silver platter. In October 1805 the Royal British Navy defeated the combined 
French and Spanish fleets, each of whom were the only European States that possessed 
overseas holdings comparable to Britain’s (World Book, 16). This decisive victory gave 
Britain uncontested rule of the seas which would continue until the end of World War 
One and the rise of America a full 120 years later. At the same time the battle set back the 
ability of France and Spain to even contest the ability of the British overseas. With this 
security Great Britain was able to effectively govern its overseas holdings however it 
wanted without needing to answer to any other powers. The British turned this advantage 
in trade to an advantage in economy, combining its burgeoning industrial capacity and 
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trade surplus making it by far the richest European nation in the nineteenth century. 
Britain became a hegemon that did not need to rely on its military for strength, preferring 
to use its considerable economic assets.  
 Once Britain was well established as a benign hegemon (Huntington, 40) it could 
use its influence to foster peace, after all, war would do nothing but disrupt business. 
Because Britain controlled the majority of the foreign sea trade with Europe they were 
allowed to make the rules. War would be bad for their interests because they would lose a 
large segment of their market as well as not being able to focus on their colonies. For the 
Europeans a war would mean that they would not get good treatment from Britain, it 
would always be better to be on London’s good side. It’s clear that the world of 1816 was 
not a multipolar world, but was a uni-multipolar world. A uni-multipolar world is one 
with many small powers, in this case Russia, Austria and the like. Above those smaller 
powers however is one large hegemon who can dictate to the smaller powers 
(Huntington, 39) 
 Similar to the present day role of the United States, the Europe of the 19th century 
wasn’t truly a multipolar system. As Huntington argues, Britain was acting as a regional 
hegemon (40). The title of regional hegemon is the goal of all great powers. Being a 
regional Hegemon means a power is a position to be in complete control of the part of the 
world it occupies. At the same time the Hegemon can dictate its wishes to the smaller 
powers. In the 1800’s all the land based empires competed against one another to be in 
the position Britain was in. 
While Britain did not have the largest military of the era, its influence in World 
affairs and World trade were unrivaled for nearly 100 years. There were none who could 
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ever hope to compete with Britain alone. This fact alone inspired a form of peace. It made 
much more sense for two countries such as France and Austria to work together to form a 
bloc against Britain and potentially gain power, than fight each other and waste their 
diminished power on each other. This also meant that Britain could direct many decisions 
of other countries by using their significant leverage. If there were a conflict that required 
intervention, Britain would essentially declare a de facto victor in bringing the weight of 
its empire and its riches to bear. In essence, the specter of British involvement in a 
conflict was deterrent enough without the use of military power. Thomas Schelling 
argued this point, true power is the threat of force, when force is used the power that 
comes from that threat of force is gone (Diplomacy of Violence, 302). Like the United 
States, Britain’s power was primarily based on Economic might, what political theorists 
would call “soft power.” While Britain did have a highly trained military, their numbers 
were such that they could not hope to compete in a one on one fight with another 
European power on their home turf. In that way, it also remained in Britain’s best interest 
to maintain European peace; both to protect their trader partners, and to avoid 
overextending military resources they did not have. In this Britain used what Mead called 
“Sticky Power,” making other countries want what you want through complex 
interdependence. According to Mead, economy causes trade and trade causes peace 
(Mead, 50). 
 It seems then, that the reason peace lasted so long after the Napoleonic Wars had 
less to do with the Concert itself and more to do with the stability granted to Europe by 
Britain as a regional hegemon. The Concert was a product of the peace, not a cause. 
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While it may be true that the peace was so successful due to the work of Britain as 
the unipolar power, the Concert of Europe was not a complete waste. Never before had 
the powers of Europe ever attempted to conduct foreign affairs in an open forum. The 
idea of Functionalism, or “peace in pieces” was very new in 1816 and it didn’t resemble 
anything one considers functionalism in today’s world. There wasn’t the collective 
security agreement of the League of Nations nor was there the carefully organized 
assembly of today’s United Nations. Yet the goal and drive for diplomacy still existed in 
1816 as it does now in 2007. The Concert of Europe represented the first time the states 
of Europe looked to diplomacy and organized relations in an open forum as a way to 
solve problems before they went to war. It’s incredible to think that the Congress of Aix-
la-Chappelle in 1818 that withdrew all occupying troops from France was the first 
peacetime meeting of European leaders ever! (Schenk, 116) As far as collective 
government however there was nothing in the way of written rules and regulations that 
needed to be followed. The Concert was a strictly voluntary affair. Yet this still shows the 
willingness and desire for peace in Europe by those who took part.  
In a larger sense the world of post Napoleonic Europe has lessons that can be 
applicable today. The same qualities that made the Concert of Europe and its peace so 
noteworthy (regional hegemon, long period of peace, first attempt at liberal 
institutionalism) makes it significant and applicable to world politics today and in the 
past century. The Institutionalism that the Concert was built on remains in an evolved 
form in the United Nations. The role of Britain as a regional hegemon maintaining peace 
is the role that the United States plays in today’s world. These examples also tend to 
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prove the idea that peace, at least in these cases, is maintained by a strong unilateral 
power and less by large international organizations or congresses. 
In 1919 the most devastating war in history had just ended and the Napoleonic 
Wars seemed like ancient history. At US President Woodrow Wilson’s urging the great 
powers of the world created and pledged support to the newly formed League of Nations. 
The membership of this league was more diverse than the Concert 100 years previous, it 
still featured old European Empires but was also open to the new powers throughout the 
world such as Japan. Significantly the United States did not join the League, right at a 
time when its rising power made it essential to keep the peace. Britain was still a great 
power but with advances in communications and transportation, particularly over the 
oceans, the world was shrinking and Britain’s power counted for less. The world was no 
longer a uni-multipolar world; it was again a multipolar one. Britain did not have the 
ability to influence world affairs as it once did and when the situation deteriorated in the 
1930’s with Germany there was little it could do effectively. Significantly, when the 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain looked to broker a deal with Hitler respect for 
Britain’s power had sunk so low that the German leader said, “If that funny little man 
comes up here again, I shall kick him down the stairs.” 
After the horrors of World War II the world looked to fix the problems of the 
League of Nations with the creation of the United Nations. The UN sought to fix many of 
the problems that plagued the League. One of the primary problems was the inability of 
the League of Nations to use military force to back up its resolutions. The UN fixed this 
problem with the creation of a Security Council that had the authority to send the UN to 
war. The Security Council has at its core the militarily strong countries that were the 
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winners in World War 2, in short, countries capable of maintaining peace if needed. The 
UN also learned a lesson from the Concert and the and separated the powers and 
responsibilities of the UN among different branches, with the Security Council dedicated 
to peace and the Economic and Social Council dedicated to development. Most 
significantly, the United States of 1945 was very different from the country it was in 
1919. By the end of the war the United States was by far the strongest country in the 
world and was in a position that the Britain of the past century couldn’t have dreamed of. 
America was able to not only affect decisions by economics, America also had the most 
modern military force in the world and was able to send them everywhere in the world to 
influence policy for its own ends. While the fairness and decency of this practice may be 
questionable, the result is inarguable. With peace being the United State’s main objective, 
as well as the retention of hegemon status, they have little reason to endorse a war except 
on their terms. Thus, it becomes the goal of every country to avoid getting on the United 
States’ “bad side.” The United States gave the UN legitimacy where the decreasing 
power of Britain as a great power could not with the League of Nations.  
It may be that it was not the strength of America that helped maintain a period of 
peace but the balance of the United States and the Soviet Union. Their propensity to 
destroy each other with Nuclear Weapons was a check on the violence of both (For Better 
or Worse, 331). In the context of looking at the Concert of Europe and League of Nations 
however, there have been many instances of a bipolar system supported by many smaller 
powers. Pre World War I there was Britain and Germany, which were both powers that 
competed with each other, but in the end, it was the ability of Britain to broadcast its 
power that maintained peace beyond mistrust they had for Germany. In the context of 
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Regional Hegemony, both America and the Soviet Union held enormous sway over their 
respective parts of the world. As successful they were at avoiding war with each other, 
both powers had a stake in maintaining peace within their spheres of influence. 
There are many lessons that politicians and leaders can learn from the early 19th 
century after the Napoleonic Wars ended. Firstly and perhaps most significantly in the 
period immediately after the conclusion of hostilities the loser should be present at the 
piece talks with equal footing as the winners. This accomplishes two things: the loser 
feels like they have a stake in the peace and can help create a system they can maintain. 
Secondly it also avoids the tendency to enact punitive clauses in the agreement such as 
those present in the Treaty of Versailles after WWI (Kegley, 73). By many accounts the 
clauses present in the treaty that sought to cripple Germany in reality led them to seek 
revenge on the attack on their country and made them turn to Hitler.  
Another lesson learned from the Concert of Europe is the importance of having a 
system in place where powers could meet one another in a neutral forum to talk about 
disagreements. While this development may have more to do with modernization and less 
to do with diplomacy in 1816 its importance remains. The goal of providing a forum is 
one shared by all three international systems of the past two centuries. The Concert and 
the groups that followed it also show that if you are going to have groups who seek to 
solve problems, give them the tools to do so. Often this has meant the use of military 
power, a concession that only the United Nations made. This is the goal of 
Institutionalists, who believe that peace requires a body to enforce it made up of states 
with peace as their overriding desire.  
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Seemingly most importantly in order for peace to prosper there needs to be one 
state strong enough to enforce it. Before the Concert of Europe the only “empires” were 
land-based or were not organized in a fashion to promote order. At the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars Britain was in a unique position to create peace not only in Europe but 
also around the world because of their ability to transmit power. They were the best in all 
areas, economic, or what is called “soft power,” and military power (hard or “sharp” 
power) (Mead, 48). Part of the reason World War One broke out was because it took 
place at a time when Britain’s role in the world was changing and there were no other 
powers capable of filling its shoes. Before World War II there were no powers that were 
capable (or willing in the United States’ case) to maintain a peace by creating a uni-
multipolar world.  
The necessity of a strong regional hegemon seems to indicate that when talking 
about something as vague as “world peace” the patterns seem to indicate the validity of 
Realism’s viewpoints. While institutionalism is nice and moral it seems that military 
power as wielded by a strong power with a stake in the peace is more effective at 
avoiding war. An international organization certainly helps to address grievances, but if 
those grievances are to be fixed it takes the intervention of a strong power with the will 
and ability to cause change.  
So finally it seems that the theory best supported by the continual emergence of 
hegemons is long-cycle theory. Political Scientist Paul Kennedy argues that over the past 
5 centuries every large war is followed by the rise of a singular strong power and 
institution building (Kennedy, Washington Post). In that same vein, every large war is the 
result in the decline of that power and the rise of another. This theory holds a great deal 
 Brunelle 15
of water if one looks at the cycle of the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars using 
France, Britain, and finally America as the successive Hegemons and the Concert of 
Europe, League of Nations, and the United Nations as their respective institutions. It 
seems fitting to bring in Samuel Huntington’s idea of a benign hegemon, which is a 
hegemon that utilizes its economic might before its military might. Power comes from 
cooperation not from coercion. It is Huntington argues that the benign hegemon is the 
solution to Mearsheimer’s “911 problem” (Huntington, 47). The benign hegemon is the 
world’s police, traveling the world to protect weaker countries, maintaining peace as well 
as the balance of power. 
It appears that political scientists are correct in their claim that the most unstable 
balance of power is a multipolar system. While some credit goes to the Concert of Europe 
for maintaining peace for so long from 1815 to 1870 a large part of that success had to do 
with the rise of the regional hegemon in Great Britain. With the decline in Britain’s 
relative power in the beginning of the 20th century came the return of a multipolar world, 
and war broke out. Today’s extended period of relative peace can be laid at the feet of 
another regional hegemon, the United States. It may be appealing and easy to lay the 
success on the Concert alone, but it seems it is Realism that provides most of the answers 
for its successes. Without a strong power to balance weaker powers the weaker powers 
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